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REWARDS TO INFORMERS. RESPONSE TO LENE RUBINSTEIN

Lene Rubinstein's paper is part of her long, industrious and fruitful preoccupation with the legal roles individuals assumed in Athenian litigation and especially the figure of the public prosecutor¹. In the latest sequel, she focuses on financial reward, that is a fixed amount of money or a percentage or a fraction of a penalty, usually set in advance for initiating legal proceedings. Therefore, she excludes i) honorary or symbolic rewards such as crowning, *sitesis*, *proedria*, etc., and ii) monetary rewards for enforcing the death penalty in cases of overthrowing the democratic regime, or installing a tyranny as in the third-century Ilion decree against tyranny, in which anyone killing the tyrant is rewarded among others with a considerable sum of money².

¹ See Rubinstein (2000); (2003a); (2003b) and (2005). Enforcement: Rubinstein (2007); (2009) and (2010). Her research impinges upon the wider question of law enforcement in classical Athens and the role of the *polis*.

² Enforcing death penalty on Diagoras of Melos and offering reward, Aristoph. *Birds* 1072-1087 (and the scholia on 1073, as well as Scholia on Aristoph. *Ran.* 320); *FGrH* 326 (Melanthios) F3 and 342 (Krateros) F16 and Diod. Sic. 13.6.7. Symbolic reward in *IK* 1 (Erythrai) 503 (3rd century BC, statue of Philites). Anti-tyranny law of Ilion: *IK* 3 (Ilion) 25, 19-28 (beg. 3rd century BC): [ὅς δ'] ἄν ἀπ[οκτ]είνηι τ[ὸν] τ[ύραν]νο[ν] ἢ τὸν ἡ[γεμόνα] τῆ[ς] ὀλιγαρχ[ι]ᾶς ἢ τὸν τὴν δ[ημοκρα]τία καταλύον[τ]α, ἑὰ μὲν ἔναρχος, τὰ/λαντον ἀργυρ[ί]ου λ[αμβάνειν] παρὰ τῆς πό[λεως] αὐθιμερὸν ἢ τῇ δευτέρῃ, [καὶ] εἰκό[να]/ χαλκῆν αὐτο[ῦ] στ[η]ῆ[σ]α[ι] τ[ὸ]ν δῆ[μον]· εἶναι δὲ/ αὐτῷ καὶ σίτη[σ]ιν [ἐ]μ πρυ[τα]νείῳ, [ἐ]ως [ἄν] ζῇ[ι],/ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶ[σι] εἰς π[ρο]εδρίαν [κηρύ]σσεισθαι ὀνομαστεῖ καὶ δύο δ[ρ]αχμάς δίδωσθαι/ αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας μέχρι ἂν

The paper traces the underlying relationship between the reward provided to volunteers when assuming a legal role, such as informer, denouncer or prosecutor, and the deterrent effect it may produce. She considers that deterrence could be enhanced once personal gain or pure greed entered into the equation of enforcement; in other words, financial inducement increased the likelihood of (successful) prosecution of law breakers (but not their conviction). But such a premise presumes the existence of a weak central, hierarchical enforcement mechanism, or, to put it mildly, of a diffused enforcement³. To what extent and how the deterrent effect can be measured? Given that there can be no quantitative studies over a long period of time, we should rely on the frequency and intensity of references to rewarding the volunteer. But even these two correlates depend on other factors, such as the survival of evidence.

The paper is divided in two parts, the first focuses on classical Athens and in particular discusses reward to those providing information and to those enforcing the provision of a law as in *phasis* or a judgment as in the cases of *apographe*. The second part explores different aspects of the reward-payment provisions in enactments from other Classical and Hellenistic Greek *poleis*. Although I share most of Rubinstein's analysis, I would like to review the argument and express some reservations and counter arguments over her suggestion that the use of rewards for volunteers in Athens and in other Greek cities did not differ substantially (p. 419).

First of all, I think that we should distinguish between, on the one hand, the authority granted to any citizen (*ho boulomenos*) to bring a prosecution (with or without a reward, to enforce a law or a verdict) and, on the other hand, the award of a certain amount of money or percentage of a monetary penalty to an informer. The distinction between reward for informing and for enforcing penalties, espoused by Rubinstein (p. 420), seems to me quite restrictive even for Athens; the cases of [Dem.] 43 (*Against Macartatus*) 71 (uprooting olive trees) and 59 (*Against Neaira*) 16

ζημι with Teegarden (2014). Similarly in Meiggs-Lewis 43 from fifth-century Miletos (470–440 BC), those who will kill Alkimos, Kresphontes and the son of Nympharetos, following probably a lawcourt decision or a decree, are awarded 100 staters drawn from the confiscated property of Nympharetos, καὶ ὃς ἂν τινα τούτω κατακτείνει, ἑκατὸν στατήρας αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν Νυμφαρήτο... In this respect see also inscription SEG 57.1409 A, 1–13 (Sagalassos, beg. 3rd century BC) in which the implicit but vague inducement to enforce the death penalty: ἀκραν μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι μηθένα μηδὲ ἄλλο ὅρος μηδὲν μηδὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐγβάλλειν μηδέ/να μηδὲ στασιάζειν μηθένα μηδὲ ὅπλα ἐκ/φέρειν μάχιμα μηδένα· ὃς δ' ἂν ἀλῶι τούτω[ν]/ τι ποιῶν ιδούσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν δικαστῶν ὅσοι ἂν βουλευῶνται τεθνήτωσαν/[ἀ]ποκτεινάτωσαν δ' αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις καὶ οἱ δικασταί/[ι δ]σοις ἂν δὲ μὴ δύνωνται ἀποκτείνειν ἀλλὰ ἐχφύγω[ι]γωσίπου φυγαδεύσαντες ἔστωσαν πολέμιοι τῇ[ι]/πόλει καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἕως ἂν ἀποθάνωσιν καὶ αὐτοί/ καὶ οἱ ἐγγονοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὃς ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν περιτυν/χάνημι που ἀποκτεινάτω καὶ ἔστ' αὐτῷ κομίζειν σκυλα.. In most cases, however, the killer is pronounced free of any guilt, ὅσιος, μὴ μιαρὸς, εὐαγὴς καὶ καθαρὸς (e.g. IG ii³ 320 (Athens); SEG 26.1306 (Teos); IK 5 (Kyme) 11).

³ It is not the place to resume the whole debate whether the Athenian society was a society of feud or a society of law and order; see recently Harris (2007). It is important, however, and it should be stressed that it is the *polis* that concedes this means of prosecution.

(illegal cohabitation with a foreigner) do not concern enforcement of a verdict but initiative to prosecute law-breakers.

Reward to informers was not paid irrespectively of the reliability of the information; at least that is what inscriptions from late fifth-century Thasos and third-century Abdera explicitly state⁴. If this is true, then, the reward to volunteers can be regarded as an insurance against the risk they assume. Therefore, we have to take into account that a decision to inform or initiate voluntarily legal proceedings would have involved a cost-benefit analysis, in which the benefits should considerably outweigh any costs. Benefits would include any monetary reward, while costs would comprise not only expenses and monetary losses in case of defeat, but also fines imposed in case law compelled individuals to inform on transgressors⁵. But perhaps, this is too much of an economist's approach.

Part I. Rubinstein quite rightly emphasizes the exceptional character of reward to informers as it emerges from the case of the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae. Her analysis brings forward the rationale of employing extraordinary measures to combat an extraordinary situation involving close-knit groups operating in private spaces. She, also, judiciously identifies the political-ideological element of the Athenian choice not to employ systematically reward as part of the armour against delinquency, although she does not consider it as an adequate explanation (p. 420). I believe that we have to insist on that aspect and explore its repercussions. One of the cornerstones of the Athenian democratic legal system as understood and practiced in the fourth century BC, was the right of any Athenian (*ho boulomenos*) to bring a suit in defence of those wronged. In the handbook of Athenian constitutional history and law, *AthPol.* 9.1 this right is designated as one of the most popular initiatives of Solon⁶. This key element impinged both on

⁴ Meiggs - Lewis 83A, 1 and B, 8: *καὶ φανῇ ἐόντα ἀληθέα; I Aeg. Thrace 2: καὶ φανῇ ἀληθῆς οὔσα.* Reward in Hermokopidai case in Athens: And. 1 (*On the Mysteries*) 27-28, 40 and Thuc. 6.27.2.

⁵ Legally enforced duty to inform on violations, Chios: *SEG* 61.700, 2-20: [ἐν τ]/οῖς ἄλλεσιν μ[ὴ] ποιμ[α]ίνεν μηδὲ κοπρ[ε]οῦ[σ]ιν/[ν] ἦν δὲ ποιμαίνῃ [ἢ ὕ]/φορβῇ ἢ βοκολῇ, [ὁ ἰ]/δὼν κατειπάτω πρ[ὸς]/ τὸς βασιλέας ἀγν[ῶς]/ πρὸς τὸ θεοῦ τῶι δὲ π[ο]/ιμαίνοντι ἢ ὑφορβέοντι ἢ βοκολέοντι ἢ/[μ] ἱεκτον ἴθυνα ἔστω/ κατὰ κτήνος ἔκαστο/ν ἦν δὲ κοπρεῶν ἀλί/σκηται, πέντε στατή/ρας ὀφειλέτω ἀγνῶς/πρὸς τὸ θεοῦ ἦν δὲ ὁ ἰδ[ὼν] μὴ κατεῖπει, πέντ/ε στατήρας ὀφειλέτ/ω ἱερὸς τῶι θεῶι and II. 27-30 similarly for equipment removed from the sanctuary: ἦν δὲ μὴ κατεῖπει πέντε στατήρας ὀφείλιν ἱερὸς τῶι θεῶι. Delos: *SEG* 48.1037B (c. 180-166 BC), 22-24: καὶ εἴ τις συνειδῶς/[μὴ] δηλώσει ἐν τοῖς ἀστ[ρ]υνόμοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς/[ἐνοχον εἶναι ...]; *IG* xi (4) 1296 (mid 3rd century BC), A 8-11: καὶ ὅστις/ συνειδῶς μὴ δηλώσει ἐν τοῖς ἀστ[ρ]υνόμοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχος ἔστω/ and similarly in B 8-10). Paros: *SEG* 33.679, 17-24 (mid 2nd century BC): καὶ εἴ τις συνειδῶς μὴ μ[η]/ νύσειεν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ἀποδέ/κτην τὸν ἐπιμελόμενον τοῦ ἱεροῦ.

⁶ Δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία ταῦτ'εἶναι τὰ δημοτικώτατα, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δανεῖξιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, ... (The following seem to be the three most important, the ban on loans on the security of

the legal field and on ideology. Any Athenian of the classical period did not have to expect a financial inducement in order to bring a suit. Other motives, such as kinship (inheritance, homicide), friendship or comradeship, prestige, adherence to the dominant democratic ideology were equally if not more important⁷. In other words, Athenians had many more reasons to prosecute or initiate legal proceedings against fellow Athenians, as Rubinstein herself made it clear (p. 421). This array of motives relegated financial inducement to being undesirable (but not unacceptable), especially in ideological terms. It is at this level, that a good citizen never exercises (or appears to do so) his duties out of greed⁸. A citizen acting on that ground could easily be branded a sycophant. That sycophancy was associated, among other, with monetary gains is nicely depicted by Apollodoros in [Dem.] 53 (*Against Nikostratos*) 1-2, who underscores the lack of sycophancy as a motive in bringing an *apographē*⁹.

the person; next, permission for anyone who wished to seek retribution for those who were wronged; - transl. P.J. Rhodes - Penguin ed.) with commentary in Rhodes (1981: 159).

⁷ Osborne (1985: 44). Athenians did not turn altruistic in bringing *graphai* with no other interest.

⁸ On sycophancy see Harvey (1990), Osborne (1990) Wallace (2006) and Harris (1999) and (2013: 62-63).

⁹ [Dem.] 53 (*Against Nikostratos*) 1-2: ὅτι μὲν οὐ συκοφαντῶν, ἀλλ' ἀδικούμενος καὶ ὑβριζόμενος ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν τιμωρεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπογραφὴν ἐποίησάμην, μέγιστον ὑμῖν ἔστω τεκμήριον, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί, τό τε μέγεθος τῆς ἀπογραφῆς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπέγραψα. οὐ γὰρ δήπου συκοφαντεῖν γε βουλόμενος ἀπέγραψα μὲν ἂν πένθ' ἡμιμναίων ἄξια ἀνδράποδα, ὥς αὐτὸς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν τετίμηται αὐτά, ἐκινδύνευον δ' ἂν περὶ τε χιλίων δραχμῶν καὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε μηδένα αὐτίς ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ γράψασθαι: οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως ἄπορος ἦν οὐδ' ἄφιλος ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐξευρεῖν τὸν ἀπογράψοντα: ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀπάντων ἡγήσάμενος δεινότατον εἶναι ἀδικεῖσθαι μὲν αὐτός, ἕτερον δ' ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τοῦ ἀδικουμένου τοῦνομα παρέχειν, καὶ εἶναι ἂν τι τούτοις τοῦτο τεκμήριον, ὅποτε ἐγὼ λέγοιμι τὴν ἔχθραν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὥς ψεύδομαι οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἕτερον ἀπογράψαι, εἴπερ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἡδικοῦμην, διὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἀπέγραψα. ἀπογράψας δὲ ἐὰν ἀποδείξω τὰ ἀνδράποδα Ἀρεθουσίου ὄντα, οὐπερ ἐτέγραπτο εἶναι, τὰ μὲν τρία μέρη, ἃ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῷ ἰδιῳτῇ τῷ ἀπογράψαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφήμι, αὐτῷ δ' ἐμοὶ τετιμωρῆσθαι ἀρκεῖ μόνον. (I have no desire to bring a baseless and malicious charge; but I have filed this inventory of property because I have suffered wrong and indignity from these men and therefore thought it my duty to avenge myself upon them. Of this you will find convincing proof, men of the jury, in the amount of the valuation, and in my having filed the information in my own name. For, I take it, if I had wished to bring a malicious suit, I should not have listed slaves worth two minae and a half, the sum at which the claimant himself has fixed their value, and myself have run the risk of losing a thousand drachmae, and forfeiting the right ever again to indict anyone on my own behalf. Nor, again, was I so lacking in resources or in friends as to be unable to find some one to file the information; but I thought it the most outrageous thing ever seen among men, that I should myself suffer the wrong, but that another should lend his name on behalf of me, the one wronged; and that this would then serve as presumptive proof to my adversaries that I am lying whenever I speak to you of our enmity; for they would say that no other man would have filed the information, if I were myself the one wronged. It was for this reason that I filed the information. And now that I have done so, if I can prove that the slaves belong to Arethusius, to whom they are stated in the information to belong, I relinquish to the state the

Even if concealing or repudiating any sycophantic motivation is an often recurring rhetorical *topos*, the passage suggests the existence of strong undercurrents of similar inspiration in the logographic tradition. The best way to deal with such insinuations was to face them head on¹⁰.

Against these taciturn currents, in some cases a strategy of carrot and stick was adopted. Reward for prosecutors was the sweetener as it may have enticed them to bring in the case and simultaneously deterred them from abandoning the case before it was introduced to the law court, while a rule according to which a litigant in a *graphe* procedure who did not get 1/5 of the votes had to pay a fine of 1,000 drachmas was the stick. If a legal system integrates the authority to any citizen to bring a *graphe* (something that would encourage accusations for vexatious litigation), then the regular provision of a financial reward to the voluntary prosecutor would be an open admission of inadequacy, unless extraordinary circumstances require unusual means.

Phasis/phainein procedure may be divided in two distinct phases. First, an individual provides information to a magistrate about violation of a law, e.g. in the market place, and second, following the intervention of the magistrate, the offender either admits his responsibility and suffers the prescribed penalty or denies any wrongdoing (for whatever reason). The individual who, originally, provided the information has the duty to bring the offender to court. This is consistent with the lack of *polis*-prosecution authorities. Scholars have attempted to pinpoint “distinguishing characteristics of the action” *phasis/phainein*¹¹. But this relies on the untold presumption that *phasis/phainein* describes a legal action. Perhaps we can crack the nut if we assume that the terms do not describe only a legal action *stricto sensu*, but principally a legal remedy against offenders in cases in which collecting and assessing information and evidence remained beyond the potential of the *polis*-magistrates and their assistants. This suggestion seems to be corroborated by i) the fact that in cases when liability is not contested, there is not any legal hearing, but simply imposition of the prescribed penalty, and ii) the lack of any special procedural rules for *phasis*-initiated proceedings (apart from the reward to the successful plaintiff in some cases¹²). If this is right, then, *phasis/phainein* would have

three fourths which under the law are given to the private citizen filing the information; for myself it is enough to have taken vengeance.). Less explicit in Lys. 24 (*On the invalid*) 2; Isocr. 15 (*Antidosis*) 164; Isocr. 21 (*Against Euthynus*) 13; Is. 11 (*About Hagnias' estate*) 31; Dem. 19 (*On the false embassy*) 222; Dem. 21 (*Against Meidias*) 28; Dem. 24 (*Against Timokrates*) 3.

¹⁰ Cf. Osborne (1985: 48): “Overall the evidence available to us does not justify the supposition that malicious litigation was either occasioned by or a particular problem in, actions in which the prosecutor was rewarded”.

¹¹ So MacDowell (1991) and Wallace (2003). *SEG* 50.766, 35 (Kos, 2nd /1st century BC): φαίνεται δὲ ὁ χρήζων κατὰ τὸν νόμον with no further specification but possibly to include a reward.

¹² That reward was not one of the constituent elements of *phasis/phainein* procedure is indicated by the use of it in cases of administration of orphan's property and in certain inscriptions, *IG* xii (1) 762 B, 13-14 (Lindos); *IBeroia* 1 B, 29-33: ἐὰν/[δ]έ τινα ὁ γυμνασιάρχος ἔσθῃ ἀλείφεισθαι τῶν διασαφουμένων εἰδώς,/ [ἢ] ἐμφανίζοντός τινος αὐτῷ καὶ παραδείξαντος, ἀποτινέτω δραχμὰς/ χιλίας, ἵνα δὲ καὶ εἰσπραχθῇ, δότω ὁ προσαγγέλλων ἀπογραφὴν τοῖς ἐξε/[τ]

been employed in cases of disputes in the *agora*, concerning both goods and persons, as well as in other cases to which magistrates did not have access and relied mainly on relatives¹³, neighbours or bystanders.

In classical Athens, reward for providing information and initiating legal proceedings was explicitly designated in specific laws or decisions of the Council and it was limited to cases in which delinquency and perpetrators were not easily detectable.

Part II. Despite Rubinstein's healthy scepticism about the variety and fragmentation of the information provided by the epigraphic record, I think that interesting patterns and correlations emerge (with the caveat of the paucity of evidence), on several aspects, such as terminology. For example, in Delos, the verb εἰσαγγέλειν (an Athenian influence?) is regularly used to describe denouncing illegal activities such as evasion of import tax, deposition of rubbish or unauthorised herding in a sanctuary¹⁴. In the manumissions from Phokis (Daulis, Elateia and Steiris) the verb denoting the legal action to defend the freedman/freedwoman is either (ἐγ)δικάζομαι or in Steiris προΐσταμαι. However, the use of different forms of the latter verb is much more widespread in the manumissions of central Greece¹⁵.

A cursory look at the table appended (p. 434-41) reveals that reward (which in most cases was equal to 50%) was offered predominantly in the following eight categories of cases:

1. threat to the constitution (*politeia*) [Abdera, Kyme, Thasos];
2. violation of magistrates' duties [Arkesine, Astypalaia, Beroia, Delphoi, Erythrai, Hierapytna, Kolophon? (*telonikai dikai*), Magnesia on Meander, and Pergamon];
3. administration of sacred spaces [Arkesine, Delos, Demetrias, Epidauros, Ios, Kos, Lampsakos, Minoa, Paros, Priene] (to justify the intervention of individuals employed or attending ceremonies in there?);
4. administration of endowments [Aigiale, Eretria, Kos?, Kyme?, Teos];
5. manumissions [Daulis, Elateia, Gortyn, Steiris];
6. commercial activity [Delos, Delphoi, Thasos];

αρταῖς τῆς πόλεως, οὔτοι δὲ παραγραφάτωσαν τῷ πολιτικῷ πράκτορι; SEG 50.766, 35 (Kos, late 2nd/ early 1st century BC).

¹³ See Thür (2008a) and Thür (2008b).

¹⁴ Εἰσαγγέλειν is associated in most cases with denunciation to the Council (all but one reference in the catalogue).

¹⁵ See the participle προΐστάμενος in *FD* iii (3) 205 and *SGDI* ii 1726, 1938, 1951, 2145, 2261, 2275 all from Delphoi, and from Boiotia, Darmezine (1999: 27 nos 10-11, 30 no. 15, 98 no. 133). Even well into the imperial period (end of 1st – early 2nd century AD) in Phokis (Tithorea) the same cognates are used, see Rousset & Zachos (2012: 467-73 nos 1-3) (προστάμεν, προστάντος). A similar term (προστατευέτω) is attested in a manumission from third-century Messene, *IG* v (1) 1470, 5-6.

7. enforcement of a contract [Eretria, Ioulis, Koressia, Megalopolis?, Tegea].

Outside Athens, the epigraphic record cannot substantiate a widespread use of the reward strategy. In the eighty examples collected by Rubinstein, there are certain clusters either regional (e.g. in Thasos there are eight different inscriptions recording reward) or thematic - regional (e.g. in Elateia there are seven cases in which reward is offered, all in manumission documents). The remaining *poleis* do not display more than maximum four occurrences, sometimes dispersed or isolated.

Instead of regarding reward as a common strategy employed in various ways by the Greek *poleis*, including Athens, I suggest that reward, despite its obvious deterrent element, was not widely used; it was implemented rather sparingly in cases in which violations could have been easily concealed, either due to a closely delimited space, both physical (e.g. home, sanctuary, market place) and social (e.g. family, arrangements between partners) or to inefficiently policed context (market place, accountability of magistrates). Only in that sense Athens was not so dissimilar to other Greek cities.

Finally, it is interesting to notice that in the second century BC similar practices spill over the confines of *polis* enactments into the decrees of a private association in Delos and of a local *koinon* in Caria¹⁶.

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¹⁶ Delos: *IDelos* 1520, 81-89 (153/2 BC or later): οἱ δὲ μὴ ποιήσαντές τι τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι κατακεχωρισμένων ἔστωσαν μὲν καὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ ἔνοχοι, προσαγγελλέτω δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν θιασ[ι]/[τ]ῶν οἷς ἔξεστιν· ὁ δὲ ἀρχιθιασίτης αἰεὶ ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὧν εἰσαγέτ[ω]/ τὸν κατήγορον καὶ τὸν ἀπολογούμενον καὶ ἀναδιδότω ψήφον/ τοῖς θιασίταις ..ΕΝΑΔ[. τοῦ εὐ]θυνομένου ἔστω τῷ προσαγγεῖλαντι, κομισαμένου τοῦ [αὐ]τοῦ τὸ τρίτον μέρος τοῦ εἰσπραχθέντος· ἐὰν δέ τι [ὁ ἀρχιθιασ]ίτης μὴ ποιήσῃ, ἔστω κατ' αὐ[τ]οῦ ἡ εἰσαγγελλ[ία, ἐπειδὴν ιδιωτ]ῆς γένηται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτά· Caria: *SEG* 51.1499, 30-33 (honorary decree of the *koinon* of *Leukoideis* for Sopatros son of Theon of Rhodes, c. 107-100 BC): ἐὰν δέ τινες μ[η]/ στεφανώσωσιν, ἀποτεισάτωσαν ἰε[ράς] Διὸς Ὑπάτου κα[ι]/ κοινοῦ Λευκοιδέων δραχμάς ἑκατὸν καὶ εἰσπρασσέτω/ αὐτοὺς ὁ χρήζων ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμίσει. Survival into the imperial era, *ILindos* ii 419 (AD 22) and in numerous tombstones.

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